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THE ETHICS OF BELIEF* 
by 
Brand Blanshard 
Morality is commonly supposed to be a mailer of action, not of tastes or beliefs. 
If a man neglects to pay his rent, or borrows books and keeps them, or helps 
himself Lo a collar-button at a store counter, he is regarded, and rightly. as behaving 
immorally. On the oiher hand, if be prefers a banjo to a string quartet or the comic 
strips to Mr. Eliot. his choice may cause some raising of eyebrows, but no one 
would suggest a defect in his morals. Similarly as to belief. The man who believes 
that Shakespeare was Bacon, that the earth is flat, or that the universe began in 
4004 B.C. may provoke comments on his knowledge or intelligence, but to infer 
that his character was questionable would seem to most people mere confusion. 
Yet this attitude is not held consistently. There is one field, namely religion. 
where people do very commonly take belief to be a matter of moral concern. They 
would regard with equanimity the belief of a son of theirs that Shakespeare was 
Bacon. But if they were Catholics whose creed that son had exchanged for 
Methodism. or Methodists whose belief he had abandoned for atheism, they would 
regard the change as a moral lapse. 
How is one to avoid such inconsistency? One way is to say that belief is never a 
moral matter. even in religion. Another way is to say that belief always has a moral 
complexion, even in secular affairs. It is the latter line that I am going to take. I am 
inclined to think that there is an ethics of thought as well as of practice, and that 
this ethics is the same outside religion as within it. 
There are two obvious objections to this view that had best be dealt with at once. 
One is that belief and disbelief are beyond our control. and that it is never a duty to 
do what we cannot do. The other is that only what affects others for better or worse 
is a mailer of duty. and that our beliefs affect only ourselves. 
The first objection has some force. It is absurd to blame a person for what he 
cannot help. If a man comes to work sneezing and coughing with a violent cold, we 
may avoid him or condole with him, but we should hardly blame rum. But if we find 
that he caught his cold by going to an ice show in summer clothes, we tend to lose 
patience with him and say that if qe had taken a little pains, he need not have made 
himself a nuisance to others and to himself. Now many beliefs are like coughs and 
sneezes. We may be unable to control them directly, but we can do much to control 
them indirectly. They are partly the result of our habits of attention, of reflec­
tiv�ness, of definiteness in thought, of self-criticism - habits that may be achieved 
by effort. And they are partly the result of the evidence we take into account, and 
we can do much to determine that. A man who does not like the idea that be 
evolved from sub-human forms of life can concentrate on the evidence against it, 
together with its degrading aspects; he can attend to the crassness of those who 
have supported it and the nobility of those who have opposed it, until he finds 
himself doing battle against it with full conviction. For a belief so gained he is at 
least indirectly responsible. 
• All future publication rights reserved by the author. 
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The second objection to an ethics of belief is chat our beliefs are private affairs, 
which concern nobody but ourselves. Once they are translated into action, they do 
affect others and we are responsible, but surely we may chink what we please in the 
privacy of our own minds. But the matter is not so simple. For, first, beliefs are 
sources of action. We do not say that Hitler had a perfect right to believe it per­
missible to exterminate the Jews, and that the offense began only when he acted on 
ic; we condemn both the action and the belief that issued in it. Again, the level of a 
culture depends on the habits of belief of its members. Intellectually, an Eskimo 
village lives in a different world from the London Athenaeum or the French 
Academy, and much of the difference lies in thfa, that whereas among primitive 
people the fabric of belief and custom is so rigid as to keep the individual mind 
fixed like a fly in amber, in a group that is more advanced the medium is kept from 
solidifying by the constant beating of small individual wings. In the maintenance of 
an atmosphere of freedom, in the promotion of general vigor of thought, we all 
count. What we believe is less important than the mental habit out of which it 
arises. Edward Caird used to tell his students that it was important that a belief 
should be true, and important that it be reasoned, but it was more important that it 
be reasoned than that it be true. A belief that springs from reflection has in its 
source. even when it is false, the means for its own amendment. 
But if belief does have an ethics, what rufo does that ethics lay down for us? The 
issue is a live one because two of the great disciplines of western culture, science 
and religion, have given opposing answers to it. The answer of science is the 
simpler. It was formulated by T. H. Huxley as follows : "It is wrong for a man to say 
that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce 
evidence which logically j ustifies that certainty."1 It has been put by Bertrand 
Russell in the form: "Give to any hypothesis which is worth your while to consider 
just that degree of credence which the evidence warrants." It was put even more 
uncompromisingly by another eminent scientist. W. K .  Clifford, '1t is wrong 
always. everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence.'12 
The scientist is trained to skepticism. In his own province he ties his self-·respect to 
his power to tell the difference between an unfounded conjecture, a reasonable 
hypothesis, an accepted theory, and an established fact, and to give to each the 
credence that it merits. A young scientist is secretly rather pleased if he is regarded 
as so hard-headed that, like Charles Lamb in one of his whimsical moods, he would 
refuse to admit that two and two were four until he knew what use you proposed to 
put it to. But a virtue in excess may be a vice. The ideal of science generally is to 
believe no more, but also no less, than what the evidence warrants. 
When we compare this attitude of antiseptic caution with the attitude approved 
and indeed exacted by the religious teaching of the west, we find a startling dif­
ference. Professor D. M. Baillie has pointed out that faith, comprising a double 
attitude of belief and trust, occupies a place in the Hebrew-Christian tradition that 
is unique among the religions of the world. (3) What is insisted oo is not the 
withholding of belief till the evidence warrants, but, on the contrary, the embracing 
of belief, whether intelligence is satisfied or not. In the eighth century before Christ 
we find Isaiah saying to King Ahaz when Judah was threatened with destruction by 
the Assyrians, 'If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established.'4 This 
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particular note. sounded then for the first time in 1he Biblical word, was struck 
thereafter loudly and insistencJy; indeed if the fortunes of the people went awry, it 
was commonly laid co their want of belief; •they believed not his word, but mur­
mured in their tents . . .  ': 'they believed not in God and trusted not in his salvation . .s 
The two attitudes mentioned here, of belief and trust, were not usually 
distinguished; thinking, as a purely tbeorerical activity with ends and standards of 
its own, had none of the attraction for the Jews that it had for the Greeks; what was 
demanded was the complex artitude later described as faith, in which intellectual 
assent was blended wilh other attitudes, notably the trust a child feels in a father, a 
spiril of obedience, and the courage and hopefulness that comes with 
unquestioning trust. 
The duty of unquestioning acceptance is stressed even more strongly in the New 
Testament. The teaching of Jesus himself on this head is less than ceriain. To be 
sure. some very unq�alified statements about it are attributed to him. 'He that 
believcth and is baptized shaU be saved; but he that believeth not shall be dam­
ned.'6 Again. when Thomas doubred and asked for palpable evidence that it was his 
Master who was before him, he was rebuked for his unbelief and told, 'Blessed are 
they that have not seen and yet have believed.' But it has been pointed out that 
neither of these passages is certainly authentic. The first occurs in a section at the 
end of Mark which is plainly an addition from another hand, and the second occurs 
only in the latest of the accounts, and the least reliable historically, the 6ospe1 of 
John. There is no doubt, however, that Jesus stressed the importance of belief: he 
healed the centurion's servant, saying 'as thou hast believed, so be it done unto 
1hee': 7 lo a man who brought a son troubled with a demon he said. 'If thou canst 
believe, all things are possible to him that believeth', and when the father replied. 
'Lord, l believe; help thou mine unbelief', he cast the demon out.a: Repeatedly he 
said to those whom he healed, 'Thy faith hath made thee whole'.9 It seems clear 
that in such passages Jesus was not referring to mere intellectual assent; he was 
thinking of faith and belief much as the prophets did, as something exercised by the 
whole man, in which the belief accorded by intellect, the trust accorded by feeling, 
and the obedience accorded by will, were not distinguished. We can only believe 
that Jesus was not greatly concerned with, or interested in, those processes of 
observation, analysis, and inference that now pass under the names of science and 
philosophy, a fact that is Lhe more noteworthy because the Greek language, 
presumably carrying with it intimations of the theoretical interest so characteristic 
of the Greeks, must have flowed round him rather freely. How much we should 
give for some recorded conversation between him and a Greek like Socrates! To be 
'iure. there is something incongruous in picturing him as engaged in dialectical 
passages-at-arms with speculative opponents; his emphasis on childlike trust 
sugg�sts rather the prophet and poet than the argumentative rationalist. Still, what 
he would have said about the intellectual pursuits of an Einstein or a Frazer, or the 
intellectual scruples of a Huxley or a Clifford, we do not know. 
But we do know pn:tty clearly the attitude of St. Paul, and in this particular 
province it was the teaching of Paul rather than that of Christ himself that proved 
decisive in the thought of the West. There are two distinct strains of doctrine 
running through Christian history, one coming from the synoptic gospels and 
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stressing salvation by goodness, the other coming from Paul and stressing salvation 
by faith. Neither emphasis means to be exclusive. though their difference is im ­
portant. Paul was a man of some learning who, though a Jew, wrote in Greek and 
probably read his Old Testament in Greek. His city, Tarsus, had a University in 
which Hellenistic philosophy flourished. He knew the Greek passion for 
speculation and argument. And knowing it as few others of the early Christians did, 
he explicitly repudiated it. The wisdom he stressed was sharply contrasted with 'the 
wisdom of this world'. 'Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth 
to be wise in this world. let �im become a fool, that he may be wise. Por the wisdom 
of t his world is foolishness with God.'10 'For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom 
of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is 
the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God 
made foolish rhe wisdom of this world?'11 'We walk by faith. not by sight.'12 The 
road to belief for Paul lay not through the thickets of theological disputation but 
around them, by a path open to 'babes and sucklings'. 
Lillie by little, in the hands of imperfectly enlightened writers, this doctrine was 
dt!veloped into a bard requirement that no matter what the evidence one might 
suppose one had, assent must be given to certain tenets of the creed as a condition 
of salvation. 'In the third century', says Canon Raven. 'truth was something to be 
sought: in the fourth something to be understood: in the fifth something co be 
accepted.'13 Augustine described heresy as not only blasphemy but murder, the 
murder of souls, and therefore desening of the death penalty. 'What is more deadly 
10 the soul', he asked, 'than the liberty of error?' 
Unfortunately Augustine's view of what Christianity asks of lhe intellect became, 
under his vast influence. the official ,;ew of tlhe Catholic church, and it remains so. 
Pope Gregory XVI, repeating in a bull of 1832 the words of Augustine we ha,•e just 
quoted about heresy as the murder of souls, took occasion to denounce what he 
described as a 'most pestilential error', 'that absurd and erroneous opinion, or 
rather thar form of madness. which declares that liberty of conscience s!hould be 
asserred and maintained for everyone. '14 Protestantism has granted a greater 
latitude to thought and conscience than Catholicism, as one would expect of a 
movement that made so much of private judgment, but its record is most in­
consistent. The early reformers were anything but tolerant 'If, outside of Christ, 
you wish by your own thoughts to know your relation to God', said Luther, 'you will 
break your neck. Thunder strikes him who examines.' When Calvin sent Servetus to 
tht stake for his wrong views about the Trinity, he had the cordial approval of 
Melanchton and most other Protestant leaders; and John Knox argued that those 
who allowed acti\'e disbelievers to remain alive were them<;elve� incurring the 
divine wracb. 'In the seventeenth century the Scotch clergy taught that food or 
sheher must on no occasion by given to a starving man unless bis opinions were 
orthodox.'15 
It is needless for our purpose to go into historical detail: what we are interested 
in L1; the view of the ethics of religious belief that has prevailed in the West during 
rhe greater part of its history. Regarding this we cannot perhaps do beuer than to 
quote the sentences in which Lecky, in his great work on the rise of rationalism, 
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summarizes a long discussion: 
'Unlil the seventeenth century, every mental disposition which philosophy 
pronounces lo be essential co a legitimate research was almost uniformly branded 
as a sin, and a large proportion of the most deadly intellectual vices were 
deliberately inculcated as virtues. It was a sin to doubt the opinions that had been 
instilJed in childhood before they were examined. It was a virtue to bold them with 
unwavering, unreasoning credulity. It was a sin to notice and develop to its full 
consequences every objection to those opinions, it was a virtue to stifle every 
objection as a suggestion of the devil. It was sinful to study with equal attention and 
with an indifferent mind the writings on both sides, sinful to resolve to follow the 
light of evidence wherever ic might lead, sinful to remain poised in doubt between 
conflicting opinions, sinful to give only a qualified assent to indecisive arguments, 
sinful even to recognise the moral or intellectual excellence of opponents. In a 
word, there is scarcely a disposition that marks the love of abstract truth; and 
scarcely a rule which reason teaches as essential to its attainment, that rheologians 
did not for centuries stigmatise as offensive to the AJmighty lt>. 
What broke the hold of this system was the birth of a conviction that there was 
such a thing as an ethics of uhe intellect, and that those who followed it should be 
encouraged, not chastised. This was implicit in the arguments of the reformers, 
however reluctant they were to recogni7.e it; for unless a man was justified in 
foUowing such inward light as be had, Protestantism had no ground to stand on. 
Little by little. and with painful struggle, the principle won its way that when one's 
own considered insight conllicted with the authority of a great institution or of 
common belief, one had a right and even a duty to respect that insight. Modem 
thought began with an insistence on this principle by Descartes, who in his Rules 
for the Direction of the Mind, laid down as the justification of belief, not authority, 
but one's own 'clear and distinct perception'. Descartes was a Catholic, and tried to 
remain in the good graces of the church, but his works were put on the Index; M. 
Maritain regards him as the chief architect of intellectual disaster. 1 7  
His independence was re-enacted by two great Englishmen, an earlier and a later 
contemporary of his own. For Bacon, who was even more suspicious than 
Descartes of older traditions, 'the very contemplation of things as they are, without 
superstition or imposture, without error or confusion, is in itself more worthy than 
all the produce of discoveries. : And the plodding, honest John Locke, gave it as his 
opinion that 'to love truth for truth's sake is the principal part of human perfection 
in this world, and the seed-plot of all other virtues.' These writers also found their 
place on the Index.. The eminent Papal apologist De Maistre described Bacon as 'a 
charlatan' and wrote that 'in the study of philosophy, the contempt of Locke is the 
beginning of wisdom.'18 One may scorn Locke's conclusions if one wishes, but one 
scorns his spi1it at one's peril. His great book is not only a classic of philosophy; 
it is in a sense a moral classic, by reason of the transparent disinterestedness of his 
sober and honest mind. It captivated Voltaire, and through his demonic energy 
helped the French revolutionists to pry up the lid of Pandora's box. Many repellent 
forms fluttered out of that box. But it was found when they had settled that the hold 
of authority was conclusively broken. 
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As one looks back over this long struggle of intelligence for freedom. it  is  hard to 
deny that there has been a real conflicl of principle, that while the scientific mind 
has on the whole, though with many lapses, held it wrong to exceed the evidence 
before it, the religious mind has held that there is one great exception, and that in 
this exceptional case it is not only a right bur a duty 10 give one's belief a freer rein_ 
The question before us is whether this is true. Ought we to believe where we do not 
see? There are a great many persons who would answer Yes, and would add that 
their answer is the one required unambiguously by Christianity. Since this answer is 
clearly in conflict with the rule of science, lem us ask how those who accept it would 
justify it. There have been various ways, and it would be idle to try to look at them 
all. So let us take for closer scrutiny the view of a distinguished thinker who felt 
with equal force the claims of science and religion, and tried hard to do justice to 
them both, William James. 
James was a scientist himself; he knew the rules laid down by Huxley and Clifford 
to guide the belief of scientists, and he deliberately rejected them. This was partly 
because, in the light of what be knew of psychology. which was certainly con­
siderable, he thought their rules naive. They assumed lhat beliefs are far more 
largely a matter of reason and far less a function of wish, will. impulse, lhope and 
fear, than they are or can be. In recent years we have perhaps had a surfeit of this 
doctrine , and the readiness with which some amateur psychoanalysts would now 
r�duce :all speculative beliefs to rationalizations would not improbably horrify 
James. However that may be, be thought the high talk of the intellectualists about 
the sin o f  allowing one's belief to be affected by one's desires was unconscious cant. 
Such talk itself, he thought, was an example of the very thing it protested against. If 
we look behind 'the snarling logicality' of such men as 'that delicious en/ant 
terrible, Clifford, and bis insistence, 'with somewhat too much of robustious pathos 
in the \•oice,' that we commit ourselves to no belier of any sort that the universe 
does not extort from us by irresistible evidence, do we really find the delicate 
balance of judicial impartiality? Do rationalists hold the beliefs they do about 
religion because an impartial standard requires them, or are they insisting on a 
certain standard because that would justify their beliefs? James thought it was the 
latter. 'When the Cliffords tell us how sinful il is to be Christians on such "in­
sufficient evidence", insufficiency is really the last thing they have in mind. For 
them the evidence is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other way.' Now I have 
no doubt that a psychoanalysis of Clifford o:r Bertrand Russell would reveal much 
of interest. But I.he question is not as to lhe rationalist's motives, but whether his 
contention about belief is right. Is it Lrue that even in religion, beliefs sqould be 
accepted only on logically relevant evidenice? 
This James denies. That is the point of his famous essay on The Will to Believe; 
evidence is not the only thing chat justifies, belief. Regarding most problems he 
would agree that we should suspend belief till the evidence comes in. and in many 
cases we could quite well suspend ic permanently. There would be no sense in 
laboring for a decision as between sub·and supra-lapsarianism, becaust! neither 
position is to-day a live or plausible hypothesis; nor would there be any sense in 
entertaining a conviction about the number of hairs on one's head, for that is not 
worth finding out; nor would there be any point in rushing to an opinion about the 
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nebular hypothesis: Lha1 can wait. 
All this is obvious enough. But now suppose you are confronting an option. that 
unlike the first is a live option, that unlike the second is momentous, and unlike the 
third is forced . Suppose, to take James' example, you are confronted with the 
option whether to believe in God or not? Then what should you do? People around 
you draw you both ways; the issue is clearly a Live one. It is momen1ous because, at 
the least, it means much to your happiness. And it is forced. for you can hardly 
dodge it; you have Lo take some attitude; you have to act either as if God existed or 
he did not: ev,cn to decline the choice is to commit yourself. since it is in effect lo 
act as if he did not. What are you lo do? You try to look at the evidence, with the 
result that your head begins to go round; you were not born lo be a philosopher. 
You read a bit of C. S. Lewis and a bit of Bertrand Russell. and find that arguments 
which to the first are demonstrative are to the second preposterous. Your thought 
is confused; the evidence conflicts; the doctors disagree. If. in this predicament, 
you went lo James for advice. it is pretty clear what he would do. In his en­
thusiastic. generous, aCfectionate way, he would put his hand on your shoulder and 
say, 'My dear fellow. forget your scruples. Life is more important than certainty. 
and action than knowledge. Don't be a lily-livered intelJeclual. Go ahead and 
believe.' 
He would support this ad,·ice as follows. If you insist on not exceeding the 
evidence, you will avoid being Laken in, and that, LO be sure, is something: but by 
such a policy you make your IUe cautious, unadventurous. negative, and thin. On 
the other hand, if you commit yourself. you do run Lhe risk of error, but you gain all 
the advantages - the assurance, the hopefwloess, lhe serenity, the in­
domitableness. the fundamental freedom from care - of the man who is convinced 
that 'God's in his heaven and all's right with the world.' James felt that the ad­
vantage of the man with such a belief is enormous, and for my part I should agree. 
His point is that to govern your belief in an issue like this by considerations of 
evidence is to fail to see the problem in perspective; it is to make too much of trUlh 
in comparison with the other values of life; it is to fail to see that such a choice of 
belief is really An investmenl in which we should be governed by the largest 
prospective return. 
There is something extraordinarily persuasive about this view, particularly as 
urged with James' infectious: warmth. And yet even before we have examined it, 
probably most of us feel in it too much of the siren's song. To put it baldly, is not 
James telling us that we should believe something, that is, accept it as true, on the 
totally irrelevant ground that it will be to our advantage to do so? And is not that 
telling us that self-deception is at times a right and a duty? For surely we should be 
deceiving our.selves if we believed on that ground. as is plain in coarser cases. If a 
man justified his belief 1ha1 he bad an I.Q. of 160. or that his motor car was the 
Caste t in the country. on the ground Lhat it gave him the greatest satisfaction to 
think so, we should suspect a twist in his mind. These beliefs might be true, but we 
should regard it as fantastic self-deception to believe lhem for the reasons gh•en. 
The personal .advantage or disadvantage of believing something, we say, has simply 
nothing to do with its truth. And when we are told to act as if it had, we inevitably 
shrink back.19 
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James might ask. 'Just why should you shrink back? To be deceived is bad; ad­
mitted. But in the first place. there is a chance that you may not be deceived: you 
do not know that your belief is false, and it may tum out true. And in the second 
place, the personal gains, whether it is true or not. are so enormous as to outweigh 
1hc evil of any possible error: Neither point leaves one content. Even if the belief 
we accepted on these grounds did turn out to be true, we should still have deceived 
ourselves, for we told o·urselves that we might justiriably take it as true, whereas on 
the evidence before us, we could not. 
No doubt James wot11ld here fall back on the second contention. The rationalist, 
he would say, is forgetting that reason is only one of life's activities, and its good 
only one among many goods. You cannot order the whole of life with reference to 
just one of its activities. and sacrifice the good of the whole man to the particular 
good of man as thinker. What you would be doing if you did that would be to make 
your special rule of intellectual ethics violate your rule for ethics generally; you 
would exalt a narrower and smaller good over a wider and larger good. 
James is here on strong ground. It is right for the artist to pursue beauty; but the 
artist is also a man, and bis duly as a man 1Lakes precedence over his ducy as an 
artist ; to purchase artistic distinction at the price of moral degeneracy, as Verlaine 
and Gauguin did, is not lo make a good bargain. It is right lo pursue truth, but we 
know thal when duties to family or country connicl with it, we should sometimes 
give up that pursuit. At times it  would seem to be a duty lo leave ignorance and 
error undisturbed. l i  an old man or woman is happy in a faith one lhinks illusory, it 
is certainly the kinder and probably the better course to hold one's peace. The 
sensiti,·e moralist just quoted, Henry Sidgwick, when he was no longer able to 
accept Christian theology, used to withhold his negations from his students unless 
cxpre$sly asked about them, since he thought acceptance of it would probably 
contribute more to their happiness and indeed their goodness than such grey 
tidings as he had to tell. The values of the intellect, of truth and reasonableness, are 
great goods, but it is possible to over·rate them. 
Granting this. I think that James was under·rating them; and this for three 
reasons. ( I )  The first is that happiness bought at the price of illusion is 'a goodly 
apple rotten at the heart.' Thal we set a higher value on trutlh than perhaps, we know 
may be made clear in an imaginary case. Suppose we had to choose between two 
futures. in one of which we should be very happy, bul our happiness, unknown to 
ourselves, was based on a set of false views about the nature of things; and suppose 
the alternative was a furore in which we were somewhat less happy, but lived in a 
world of sober belief that we knew to be true. Which would we elect? I do not think 
it a foregone conclusion that people genera Uy would choose the world of happiness 
and illusion. Many would say, I suspect, and perhaps lo their own surprise, that 
happiness boutht by delusion was not worth the price.20 
(2) James thinks we may legitimately be moved to believe by thoughl of the 
ad' antages of belief. But is this psychologically possible? Certainly a man cannot 
say to himself. 'I know that the evidence for this belief is inadequate, and that it 
may therefore be false, but because the advantages of believing are so great, I 
hereby resolve to believe; and when the course is thus baldly described, it is hard to 
suppose that James would think it either possible or desirable. Yet he is saying 
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something pain£ully like it,  and whatever precise ly he meant, it will repay us to 
consider this \.·iew. 
We ha'e seen that it is possible to control belief in some measure if it is done 
indirectly andl over a period of time. Many persons, when they have become aware 
that they were moving toward an abyss of skepticism, have met the danger nol1 by 
going forward and exploring it. but by retreating into a cent where the thought of it 
was taboo: and they have found that if they stayed long enough in that close al· 
mosphere, the stirrings of conscious questioning gradually ceased. It is dangerous 
to cite cases. because one is raising questions here of ultimate sincerity on which no 
one but the man himself, and probably not even he, can speak with certainly. But in 
reading Newman's account of his religious development, one can hardly miss his 
sense of how hard it is to achieve rational certainty of anything, how terrible it 
would be if his belief should crumble. how important it was to guard against. in­
fluence<> that might undermine it. One feels the presence in him, as Mill did in F.D. 
Maurice. of 'that timidity of conscience, combined with original sensitiveness of 
temperament, which has so often driven highly gifted men into Romanism from the 
need of a firmer support than lhey can find in lhe independent conclusions of their 
own judgment.21 He seems to have acted in accordance with the ad,ice that his 
friend John Keble ga"e to Thomas Arnold when Arnold was troubled with doubts 
about the Trinity. to 'put down lhe objections by main force whenever they arise'. 
In a day when French and German scholars were transforming Christian history 
and criticism, Newman chose to remain in almost total ignorance of their work and 
10 dwell instead on the cont ro,•ersies of Arius and Athanasuis. And he apparently 
did succeed in putting his conscious doubts behind his back. 
Thirdly. James' doctrine of the will to believe - which ought, as he recognized. 
to have been called the right to believe - is an uneasy halting-place: one must 
withdraw from it or go beyond it. What James said in the famous essay was that 
consequences might be appealed to when logical evidence failed, on the ground 
that though one might thereby miss truth, one would gain other and greater ad­
vantages: on the ground of these advantages we were justified in taking the belief as 
tnte. Now the only evidence that is relevant to the ttrutb of a belief is evidence that · 
is lop,ically relevant, and critics were not slow in pointing out that the advantages of 
a belief, as opposed to its implications, were not logically relevant. James was thus 
left in the uneasy posi tion of saying that we were justified morally in accepting what 
we were clearly not justified in accepting logically; J say uneasy 
because if we know that we are not logically justified, to say that we are morally 
justified is lo warrant an attempt at self-deception. James could escape from this 
po�i tion either by retreating or by going forward. If he retreated. and held that we 
should equate our assent to the evidence, the point of his essay was lost. If he went 
on and held that the advantages of the belief we!'e really relevant to its truth, he was 
embracing a full-fledged pragmatism. What he in fact did was to choose the latter. 
We have looked at only one proposal for justifying a belief that goes beyond the 
evidence. bull I think we should find the others similarly wanting. The natural 
conclusion from this line of argument is that belief is the same lhing everywhere. 
and does not have one set of conditions in physics and chemistry and a different set 
in religion, that the ethics of belief. lhe meaning of intellectual honesty. is 
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everywhere the same. This, I suggest, is che unavoidable conclusfon. Belief should 
follow the evidence, neither stubbornly denying what it establishes, nor impulsively 
running ahead of it and embracing as true what it does not warrant. When put in 
this way, probably most religious persons would accept the conclusion. They 
would. at any rate, draw back from the suggestion that the religious conscience is a 
coarser and less scrupulous organ than the scientific. 
Yet it must be admitted that in the practical difficulties that arise the two fields 
are hardly comparable. There is little talk in scientific circles of an ethics of belief. 
Most of the issues of science offer small temptation to our feelings to believe in one 
way rather rhan another. Of course when a man is offering a new theory to which 
he has tied his professional hopes, he is only too likely to overrate the evidence in 
hand and ignore what makes against bis theory. It is said that Newton, as be ap­
proached the end of his calculations about gravitation and saw the great law 
coming nearer, could not trust himself in his excitement and turned over the final 
calculations to another hand. But here was a theory with tremendous implications, 
in which he as its discoverer had a personal stake. Most scientific problems might 
be settled in any one of many ways so far as most o( us are concerned; we should 
find it difficult to work up any sort of passion for or against the binomial theorem or 
Ohm's law. 
But the situation as regards religion is different. Whether the world is governed 
or not by love and wisdom. is an issue of large concern to us; whether we shall live 
again after death is an issue to which no one who loves life and cares for others can 
be indifferent. The achievement of a positive belief on these points alone may alter 
the complexion of our world and give us a fresh infusion of buoyancy and hope. It is 
entirely intelligible tbatt persons who have such beliefs should look with something 
like moral loathing on those who would introduce into these all-important matters 
the detachment, the cool appraisal of evidence, the reservations and doubts and 
hesitancies, of the rationalistic mind. 
Even for those with the talent and leisure for inquiry such objectivity is difficult. 
And for the rest of us, the reply will come; it is out of the question. You cannot ask 
the plain man to sickly Ibis whole life over with the pale cast of thought. He has not 
time for these ultimate speculations; he must get on with his work; and what he 
needs from the philosophers and the theologians is an outlook that will enable him 
to do that work with a heart and a will. Refinements about going beyond the 
evidence are all very well for the philosopher who can afford such luxuries, but 
they are lost on men who barely know what evidence means. 
Every person of common sense must feel the force of this. It seems to present us 
with an unwelcome dilemma: we must give up either serenity or intellectual 
honesty. either the peace that goes with confident beliefs on ultimate things or else 
that saving salt of skepticism that is needed for integrity of mind. ls there any way 
out'! 
We should be merely deceiving ourselves if we thought that there was any wholly 
satisfactory way out. Something valuable must go. St. Francis was a great and 
happy man; so was Socrates; and in giving up the hope either of the childlike faith 
of St. Francis or the questioning spirit of Socrates, we should be losing much. But it 
is idle to say that we can have them both. Plant Socrates' mind in the soul of St. 
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Francis, and the pearly gates and jasper towers would come tumbling down in 
irreparable ruin. Plan1 the soul of St. Francis in the mind of Socrates, and the world 
of essence and implication and logical distinction would seem insupportably grey 
and inhuman. A man may try to be either Francis or Socrates, but if he tries lo be 
both. he will assuredly be neither. Their tendency is to cancel each other out. 
lo reply there is one thing that must be said unequivocally. To think is to try to 
get at the trunh. and the person who professes to be doing that will be a dupe if he 
consciously allows any thought of his own or other people's advantage to affect his 
conclusions. He will be worse if be does this as a professional philosopher, a person 
maintaineu and paid to think as straight as be can on problems of difficulty and to 
communicate his results to those less privileged than he is. Everyone has been 
repelled by the parlor atheL'it whose spirit of contradiction is obviously belted to a 
noisy little dynamo of self-importance within, or the lover of paradox who would 
rather coin a new epigram than see a new truth; 'an ethical sympathy in an artist', 
said Oscar Wilde, 'is an unpardonable mannerism.' We are not convinced. Neither 
are we by those books on apologetics or Christian evidences in which the over· 
whelming importance of reaching Lhe right and edifying conclusion held the 
writer's mind in a strait jacket. In my youth I thought Mark Hopkins' Evidences of 
Christianity a great book. When l return co it now I see that Mark Hopkins was so 
good a man, i f  one may say so. that it is idle to go to him for the truth; when the ark 
of salvation was as stake. he could afford to treat the evidence ca"alierly, because 
he knew before hand what it proved, and had to prove. I agree that a man is o'n a 
higher level if his intellectual compass habitually veers toward human good than if 
it veers to party or sel!·esteem. But as a thinker, he has no business to let it veer 
toward any pole but one. Truth lost through noble motives is just as truly lost as if 
one were deceived by some malicious demon. 
lt may be said that this somewhat self-righceous line may do for a philosopher, 
but that before he sows his doubts abroad, he may well think what they involve for 
tht! great majority of people who lack the way and the will to become philosophers. 
The whole-hearted acceptance of religious conclusions means much, both 
emotionally and morally, to numberless people; doubt of these conclusions, to say 
nothing of their rejection, robs them of their efficacy. 'You destroy wha'l is 
precious, at least to them, and give them nothing in its place.' There are 
philosophers to-day who look down on all such objections from a great height. I do 
not belong to their party. Agreeing that knowledge is a great good, I think Chat 
hope and peace and happiness are great goods also, and I can conceive a situation 
in which it would be better for mankind to remain in permanent error on some 
matter of belief if this was the price of happiness than to know the truth and be 
unhappy. Pedantic and ca·villing intellectualists in these matters are, as James 
thought, bores. But several lhings need to be said. 
First the notion that either men's morality or their happiness is bound up with any 
set or dogmas about ultimate chings seems to me untrue. It is unquestionable that 
religious belief may affect their motives for right doing in various and potent ways, 
but to say that apart from such beliefs we should have no ground for discriminating 
good from evil. right Crom wrong, is irresponsible. Our knowledge that love is better 
than hatred, happiness than misery, enlightenment than ignorance, is not an in· 
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ference from theological premises. but an independent insight which may be had 
� ith equal clearness by Christian. Buddhist, and secularist. It may be replied that 
th1\ ma� he correct in lheory, but that practtcal morality is so entwined with belief 
that the two stand or fall together. But practacal morality does not resc on so 
tremulous a base chat in order 10 keep it standing we must surround it with a veil of 
illusion a\ to what it really stands on. No doubt if people have supposed their 
morals to rest on their theology. they will go through a period of bewilderment 
\\hen that theology totters. But if they are reflective they will soon see that morality 
has a much firmer base than any of lhe speculative dogmas on which it is supposed 
LO he buitit. H they are not reflective, they may fly about aimlessly, but thoughtlul 
persons can hardly be asked to keep their candle under a bushel for fear that some 
human hutterflies should singe their wings at it. 
There �s a somewhat similar connection between belief and happiness. Religious 
dogmas may contribute to happiness; indeed, as McTaggarL said, they may 'change 
the whole aspect of heaven and earth for those who believe in them.' Nevertheless 
they do not seem to be essentiaJ to happiness. People of all faiths have been happy; 
people or aU faiths have been unhappy: it is probable that such things as health and 
temperament have more to do with happiness than any theological belief. The 
general presumption must surely be that one'!i happiness is more secure if it is 
accompanied by a true apprehension of the nature of things. These premises are 
perhaps enough for us to go on. H no dogma is essential to happiness, and hap· 
piness 1s more likely with the truth than without it. inquiry into truth need not be 
inhibited by worry about the consequences of what it may unco,er. 
It may be held, again. that if religious beliefs are regarded as justifiable only on 
e' idence, we are asking plain men to settle for themselves questions which the 
experts have found baffling. This would certainly be unreasonable. Tired Canners 
and preoccupied business men cannot be saddled with the ultimate problems of the 
universe. But of course we would not urge that they should. When they are con· 
fronted with problems that are too hard for them in science, or criticism, or 
politics, they appeal to authority for guidance. and everyone agrees that this is a 
legitimate course. II is also legitimate in religion. The responsibility of the plain 
man will then be. not to settle ultimate problems by his own unpractised wit. but to 
appraise the relative weight of authorities. There is no escaping this responsibility 
in any field. In science it is carried easily enough, since the first scientist one goes to 
\\ ilJ probably speak for most or all of his colleagues. ln politics it is far more 
onerous. since among experienced men in public life unanimity is so conspicuously 
lacking. Still, the acceptance of responsibility for choosing one's leaders is the very 
heart of democracy. and unless men can do at least this with some discrimination, 
the democratic process may as well be abandoned. The acceptance of such 
responsibility in religion is the point of intersection bel ween democracy and 
Protestantism. The democratic vie\\ in religion, as 1n politics. is that only if plain 
men are given the pri"ilege of choosing their guides can they come to choose either 
their guides or their beliefs responsibly. They have made dreadful mistakes. They 
Mil no doubt continue to make them, since in religion as in politics the doctors so 
notoriously disagree. But freedom comes at no cheaper price. 
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I realize how dreary and negative all this must sound to those whose belief is 
unquestioning, exuberant, and joyful. To go on questioning to the end! To live on 
hypotheses and probabilities! What sort of answers are these to people who want a 
creed to (jve by? Dus1y answers, to be sure. And in cases of great suffering or great 
loss, they may seem dusty beyond all tolerance. To many, belief tied co evidence 
seems nothing but a fair-weather craft, and they look with an expectant curiosity to 
se� what happens to ii when storms blow up. Sometimes it sinks, and the observers 
say, 'I told you so.' But what exactly does this show? It shows that some people's 
belief is more rocklike and immovable than others'. It does not prove that these 
people are more sensitive than others, or nobler than others. or that the beliefs they 
have found so comforting are the more likely to be true. 
One's respect, indeed, is greater for those who do not break because they 
realized beforehand that fact does not order itself with reference to our desires, 
that recognition of it and resignation to it are the true part for a man. When T. H. 
Huxley lost his eldest son, he was numb with grief, and a friend whose faith was 
serene and confident wrote to him wondering how his ethics of belief was faring 
under the blow. He replied: 'My business is to teach my aspirations to conform 
lhemselves with fact, not t o  try and make facts harmonise with my aspirations. 
Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the great truth 
which is embodied in the Christian surrender to the will of God. Sit down before 
fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived noti6n, follow 
humbly wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall learn 
nothing�2 A confident belief is a great good if one comes by it honorably. If one 
cannot have it, so also is this sort of honesty and courage. 
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